(Conflict) principles of European (consumer) contract law : an update by Calliess, Gralf-Peter
  EUROPEAN & INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
 
(Conflict) Principles of European (Consumer) Contract 
Law – an Update  
 






In April 2003 I commented on the European Commission’s Action Plan on a More 
Coherent European Contract Law [COM(2003) 68 final] and the Green Paper on the 
Modernisation of the 1980 Rome Convention [COM(2002) 654 final].1 While the 
main argument of that paper, i.e. the common neglect of the inherent interrelation 
between both the further harmonisation of substantive contract law by directives or 
through an optional European Civil Code on the one hand and the modernisation 
of conflict rules for consumer contracts in Art. 5 Rome Convention on the other 
hand, remain pressing issues, and as the German Law Journal continues its efforts 
in offering timely and critical analysis on consumer law issues,2 there is a variety of 
recent developments worth noting. 
 
B. European Contract Law 
 
Since the publication of the Action Plan on a more coherent European Contract 
Law, the Council and the European Parliament have both passed resolutions on it 
and the Commission has received contributions from 122 stakeholders. All contri-
                                           
1 Gralf-Peter Calliess, Coherence and Consistency in European Consumer Contract Law: a Progress 
Report, 4 German L. J. No. 4 (1 April 2003), at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No04/PDF_Vol_04_No_04_333-
372_Private_Calliess.pdf  
2 See Hans-W. Micklitz, The Necessity of a New Concept for the Further Development of the Consumer 
Law in the EU, 4 German L. J. No. 10 (1 October 2003), at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No10/PDF_Vol_04_No_10_1043-
1064_European_Micklitz.pdf; and Stefan Haupt, An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection Law, 4 
German L. J. No. 11 (1 November 2003), at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No11/PDF_Vol_04_No_11_1137-
1164_Private_Haupt.pdf; Kristin Nemeth & Helmut Ortner, The Proposal for a new Directive concerning 
Credit for Consumers, 4 German L. J. No. 8 (1 August 2003), at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No08/PDF_Vol_04_No_08_801-
813_european_Nemeth_Ortner.pdf  
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butions as well as a Summary of Responses prepared by the Commission are avail-
able through the Commission’s European Contract Law Homepage.3 The two most 
striking results of the consultation process are the following: On the one hand the 
so-called sector-specific approach of community harmonisation measures was criti-
cized by a variety of responses, especially from academia.4 While the Action Plan 
promoted the initiation of further sector-specific harmonisation measures and of 
the preparatory work to an optional European Contract Code as two complemen-
tary measures to be taken simultaneously, the Commission now seems to have be-
come aware of the fact, that the sector-specific minimum harmonisation measures 
are less a solution then themselves part of the problem. In other words, the frag-
mentation of Member States’ mandatory contract law rules is increasingly seen as a 
barrier to the completion of the internal market. Thus, on the very entry-page of the 
Commission’s European Contact Law Homepage today we can read: “To date the 
EC legislator has aimed to address problems in contracting in the Internal market 
by adopting measures relating to specific contracts or sectors. This sector-specific 
approach has, however, not been able to solve a number of problems.”5 On the 
other hand, while the interrelation with the Green Paper has so far been neglected 
by the Action Plan, both the Council and the academic contributions stress the need 
for coherence and coordination between the follow-up to the Action Plan and the 
Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980.6 
 
The Commission received broad support for its idea of the production of a 
Common Frame of Reference (the “CFR”), i.e. a set of common definitions and 
principles compiled in a legally non-binding text based on research projects like the 
Lando-Principles7 and designed to guide future legislation. Almost all responses to 
the Action Plan as well as the contributions to a conference involving Member 
States and stakeholders from business, legal practice and consumer associations to 
assess the development of the CFR, which was jointly organised by the European 
                                           
3 http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/ action-
plan_en.htm  




visited on 16 July 2004. 
6 Summary of Responses, p. 2 and 8 
7 The Lando Principles of European Contract Law have been compiled by an Expert Commission under 
the chairmanship of Professor Ole Lando, available at 
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Parliament and the Commission on 28 April 2004,8 voted in favour of such 
endeavor. There was a broad consensus that not only academic research projects 
under the Sixth Framework programme, but as well the Member States and other 
stakeholders should be involved in this process. Generally welcomed was the pro-
posal of Gerrit Stein of the German Ministry of Justice to create a European discus-
sion forum in which high level lawyers, such as legal practitioners or representa-
tives of the business sector, could monitor, discuss and examine the work on the 
preparation of the CFR. Dirk Staudenmayer of DG Sanco presented the initial 
thinking of the Commission’s services with regard to the necessary procedure for 
the elaboration of the CFR, especially to the question of how to best organize effec-
tive stakeholder involvement. He noted that a Follow-up Communication on both 
the form and content of the CFR and the procedures for ensuring stakeholder par-
ticipation would be presented by the Commission later this year. The contracts for 
researchers would further be awarded under the Sixth Framework programme 
most probably in July and would commence before the end of 2004.9 However, 
with regard to the intention to coordinate this research as indicated in the Action 
Plan, the Commission experienced a serious backlash. As rumours circling at the 
2004 Vienna Conference of the Society of European Contract Law10 have it, the suc-
cessor of the Lando Commission, i.e. the Study Group on a European Civil Code 
lead by Christian von Bar,11 for reasons of methodological purity (i.e. the adopted 
so-called “common core”-approach based on comparative legal analysis12 as op-
posed to the political interventionist approach of consumer law) was not willing to 
integrate the mandatory European consumer law acquis into its research project, 
and thus rejected to collaborate with the Acquis-Group13 with regard to the devel-
opment of the CFR.  
 
                                           
8 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/cont_law/ common-
frame_en.htm  
9 See Conference Summary at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/ 
cont_law/conference_summary_en.pdf  
10 The Architecture of European Codes & Contract Law, Conference in Vienna, 18 and 19 June 2004, 
programme and presentations, available at www.secola.org  
11 http://www.sgecc.net/  
12 See Lorenz, Rechtsvergleichung als Methode zur Konkretisierung der allgemeinen Grundsätze des 
Rechts, JZ 1962, 269; Schlesinger, Introduction to, Formation of Contracts – A Study of the Common 
Core of Legal Systems 1 (Vol. I, 1968); Bussani & Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European 
Private Law, 3 Colum. J. of Eur. L. 339 (1997).  
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C. European Conflict of Laws 
 
The Commission received over seventy replies to its Green Paper on the Rome 
Convention, which have been published on the Homepage of DG Justice and Home 
Affairs.14 A  S u m m a r y  o f  R e s p o n s e s  b y  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  i s  n o t  y e t  a v a i l a b l e .  
However, a summary view of the replies reveils the following tendencies. While the 
inherent interrelation of the European contract law project with the conversion of 
the Rome Convention was an issue in the replies to the Action Plan (see above at 
para. 2), the same does not hold true for the contributions in response to the Green 
Paper. As the main contact point of both projects is related to the consumer state 
principle or country of destination approach embodied in Art. 5 of the Rome Con-
vention and its interrelation with the harmonisation of the mandatory consumer 
protection laws through European directives, the following remarks are focused on 
the responses to the reform of Art. 5 Rome Convention. With regard to the precon-
ditions of consumer protection set out in Art. 5 Rome Convention, i.e. the definition 
of the situative (passive consumer) and substantive (supply of goods and services) 
criteria of application, there seems to be a broad consensus that the scope of the 
current Art. 5 is too narrow and that it should be amended in accordance with Art. 
15 para. 1 c) of the Brussels I Regulation.15 That is to say that Art. 5 of a future Rome 
I Regulation is likely to cover all kinds of contracts, including leases, licensing, 
transfer of shares etc. on the one hand, and to be applicable to all cross-border con-
tracts resulting from business activities (including e-shops), which were directed 
(among others) to the consumer’s state of habitual residence on the other hand. 
 
With regard to the legal result following from the applicability of Art. 5 there seems 
to be a general trend in the replies to stick to the ‘country of destination’-approach 
even in pure internal market cases, i.e. where the home state principle of Art. 4 (2) 
or a choice of law under Art. 3 Rome Convention would lead to the application of 
another EU Member State. For a business distributing throughout Europe this 
would imply that it may - by choice of law - try to contract under the law of its 
home Member State. But although this state had implemented the European con-
sumer directives at issue (e.g. the distance sales directive16), the laws of the 24 other 
Member States might still be applicable because the consumer’s home Member 
State might have transposed the Directive in a slightly different manner, here and 
                                           
14 http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/ 
news_summary_rome1_en.htm  
15 The Brussels I Regulation and the Council and the Commission declaration on its Articles 15 and 73 
are available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/civil/recognition/fsj_civil_recognition_general_en.htm  
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there providing for a so-called higher level of protection in accordance with the 
minimum harmonisation approach. The worst result of such conflict rule would be, 
that according to the relevant text books the question which law applies – i.e. the 
consumer state’s law or the law chosen by the business – is to be decided after a 
conflict has arisen and in accordance with a so-called “principle of favourability”, 
i.e. the law most detrimental to the business from an ex post perspective applies. 
Besides the question whether or not such doctrine did in fact embrace more a Robin 
Hood-like principle of justice than a rule of law, the business not knowing which 
Member States law will apply in advance is unable to comply with the excessive 
information obligations inherent to European consumer contract directives at the 
present state of minimum harmonization.17 
 
Strikingly, almost none of the Green Paper-contributions of learned Private Interna-
tional Lawyers are even addressing this issue.18 The German “Centre of Excel-
lence”, the Max Planck Institute for Foreign Private and Private International Law 
in Hamburg, in its 121 pages contribution,19 for example, states that the very basic 
idea of Private International Law, the application of foreign law by domestic judges 
(comitas), is inappropriate in consumer contract law (i.e. for approximately 90 per 
cent of all contracts concluded!), because the consumer bringing an action under 
Art. 15 ff. Brussels I Regulation at the court of her domicile would have to assert her 
rights under foreign law otherwise.20 Left unaddressed is the obvious question, 
whether or not European conflict rules – after some twenty years of intensified 
harmonisation of mandatory substantive consumer contract rules in Europe – must 
somehow discriminate between the application of the – with regard to consumer 
protection functionally equivalent – law of another EU Member State, and the law 
of a third State. 
 
In order to reduce the legal uncertainty inherent to the current Art. 5 (2) Rome 
Convention approach of the application of the law which is most favourable to the 
consumer (dépeçage), some propose to abolish choice of law in consumer contracts 
                                           
17 The problems arising are described in the contribution of Amazon Europe, at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/amazon_europe_en.
pdf  
18 The German Council for PIL (Deutscher Rat für Internationales Privatrecht) e.g., simply states in a 
single apodictic sentence: “Art. 5 should stick to the principle of favourability.” Thanks to the fact that 
such contribution is available in German only, it will not influence the European discussion anyways. 
19 MPI for Private Law Hamburg, Comment on the Green Paper, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/max_planck_institut
e_foreign_private_international_law_en.pdf  
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completely: this in fact would resemble the approach taken in Art. 120 of the Swiss 
Act on conflict of laws.21 While contributing to legal certainty this would, however, 
in combination with the extended criteria of application of Art. 5 (see above para. 4) 
render the harmonisation directives not only useless but, in addition, ultra vires 
with respect to the competency under Art. 95 EC-Treaty.22 The question, how to 
integrate the Internal market Home State principle, i.e. mutual recognition on the 
basis of minimum or full harmonisation, into the Rome Convention thus remains 
open. 
 
D. From Minimum towards Full Harmonisation of Consumer Law? 
 
In its Consumer Policy Strategy 2002-2006,23 the Commission indicated that the 
simple application of mutual recognition, without harmonisation, is not likely to be 
appropriate for consumer protection issues, but provided a sufficient degree of 
harmonisation is achieved, the country of origin approach could be applied to 
remaining questions.24 In order to establish the Home State principle as well for 
cross-border consumer contracts, the Commission in two recent proposals for 
consumer directives followed a so-called “full harmonisation”-approach, indicating 
that the Member States shall not be allowed to provide for a higher level of 
protection, at least not in the core areas of harmonisation. 
 
I. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
 
As a result of the Commission’s 2001 Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection and 
the Follow-up to the Green Paper that took place in 2002,25 the Commission on 18 
                                           
21 See Nordic Group for Private International Law, 36, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/nordic_group_privat
e_international_law_en.pdf; see as well Stefan Leible, in: Jenaer Expertentagung, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/news/consulting_public/rome_i/doc/jenaer_expertentagu
ng_27_28_06_2003_de.pdf  
22 See Calliess, supra note 1, at para. 45, 46. 
23 COM(2002) 208 final, available with follow-ups at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/overview/cons_policy/index_en.htm  
24 See Calliess, The Limits of Eclecticism in Consumer Law, 3 German L. J. No. 8 (01 August 2002), at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=175  
25 All documents available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/index_en.htm; see as well 
Hugh Collins (ed.), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices: Contract, Consumer 
& Competition Law Implications, den Haag (Kluwer) 2004, comprising the proceedings of the May 2002 
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June 2003 adopted a proposal for a Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices,26 
which aims at making business-to-consumer cross-border trade simpler by 
replacing the existing multiple volumes of national rules and court rulings on 
commercial practices with a single set of common rules. While the Directive con-
tains no minimum harmonisation clause, which would allow Member States to 
provide for a higher level of protection in the harmonised fields, proposed Art. 4 of 
the Directive provides that the Home State principle applies, so that businesses are 
able to set up marketing strategies throughout the Internal market under a single 
regulatory regime. However, the explanatory memorandum proposes that such 
mutual recognition was possible only on the basis of uniform rules on a high level 
of consumer protection: 
 
The Directive “fully harmonises EU requirements relating to unfair business-to-
consumer commercial practices and provides an appropriately high level of con-
sumer protection. This is needed to address the internal market barriers caused by 
divergent national provisions and to provide the necessary support to consumer 
confidence to make a mutual recognition approach workable. Member States will 
not be able to use the minimum clauses in other directives to impose additional 
requirements in the field co-ordinated by this Directive.”27  
 
While contract law is outside the scope of the Directive (Art. 3 No. 2), the Directive 
deals as much as the consumer contract directives with a core issue of consumer 
protection. Whereas the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/EC) already provided for 
the Home State principle to be applied to E-Commerce commercial activities, in the 
off-line world the conflict rule for the laws of unfair commercial practices is the 
effects doctrine (Auswirkungsprinzip), which is comparable to the Consumer State 
principle of Art. 5 Rome Convention, since both conflict rules provide for the appli-
cability of the law of the relevant market (Marktortprinzip), i.e. where commercial 
activities take place and/or a transaction is entered into.28 For this reason, the com-
bined full harmonisation and mutual recognition approach could be seen as a blue 
print as well for a conflict rule for cross-border consumer contracts. 
 
                                           
26 COM (2003) 356 final: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/directive_prop_en.pdf  
27 Explanatory Memorandum No. 30 indent 3, COM (2003) 356 final at p.8. 
28 See Gerald Spindler, Herkunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht - Binnenmarktintegration ohne Har-
monisierung? Die Folgen der Richtlinie im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr für das Kollisionsrecht, 
RabelsZ 2002, 633-709; and Peter Mankowski, Das Herkunftslandprinzip des E-Commerce-Rechts als 
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However, on 20 April 2004 the European Parliament adopted a legislative 
resolution on the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive, which promotes the 
proposal in general, but suggests among others an amendment to Art. 4 of the 
Directive, according to which by way of derogation from the Home State principle, 
for a period of five years from the transposition of the directive, Member States 
shall be able to take national measures which are more rigorous or restrictive.29 This 
was followed by a political agreement reached by the Competitiveness Council on 
18 May 2004, in which the Home State principle provided for in Art. 4 No. 1 of the 
Commission’s proposal was abandoned. In its place, a new Art. 3 No. 5 a reads as 
follows: “For a period of six years from the date referred to in Article 18, first 
subparagraph, Member States shall be able to apply national provisions within the 
field approximated by this Directive which are more restrictive or prescriptive than 
this Directive and which implement directives containing minimum harmonisation 
clauses. These measures must be essential to ensure that consumers are adequately 
protected against unfair commercial practices and must be proportionate to the 
attainment of this objective. The review referred to in Article 17a may, if considered 
appropriate, include a proposal to prolong this derogation for a further limited 
period.”30 
 
While the EP proposal would only postpone the effects of full harmonisation for a 
time period of 5 years, the Council made it a six years postponement with an option 
for infinite prolongation of such period. These amendments may be taken as a 
symbol for the deep disregard with a “full harmonisation”-approach in consumer 
issues, not only within the Member States represented by the Council, but even in 
the usually more integration friendly European Parliament. The Directive will 
undergo a second reading in the European Parliament this autumn. 
 
II. Consumer Credit Directive 
 
On 11 September 2002 the Commission presented a proposal for a revision of the 
consumer credit directive (87/102/EEC) of 1986.31 While the latter as amended by 
Directives (90/88/EEC) and (98/7/EC) is comprised out of 19 brief articles, the 
former proposal for its revision amounts to 89 pages with 38 Articles and three 
Annexes containing a vast amount of mathematical formulas with examples for 
calculation (for: iudex non calculat). The substance of such proposal has already 
                                           
29 Doc. A5-0188/2004: http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P5-
TA-2004-0298+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&L=EN&LEVEL=3&NAV=S&LSTDOC=Y  
30 http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/04/st09/st09667.en04.pdf  
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been discussed in this Journal.32 With regard to the extent to which this proposal 
aims at further harmonisation, it contains a great  innovation, i.e. an explicit 
harmonisation clause which reads as follows:  
 
  “Article 30 Total harmonisation and imperative nature of the directive’s provi-
sions. 1. Member States may not introduce provisions other than those laid down in 
this directive, except with regard to: a) registration of credit agreements and surety 
agreements in accordance with Article 8 (4); b) the provisions concerning the bur-
den of proof referred to in Article 33.”33  
 
While the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive contains explicit language on the 
introduction of the Home State principle in Art. 4 (see supra 1.), but in its legally 
binding part no full harmonisation clause, the Consumer Credit Directive to the 
opposite contains a “total harmonisation”-clause, but no conflict rule for purely 
internal market cases, except for the usual exclusion of the choice of law of a third 
State. Under the regime of the Rome Convention, some argue that so-called “pure” 
credit agreements which are not linked to the supply of another good or service do 
not constitute a (financial) service under current Art. 5 (1) of the Rome Convention, 
so that under Art. 4 (2) Rome Convention the law of the home state of the creditor 
will govern cross-border contracts. However, this will change once Art. 5 (1) Rome 
Convention is amended in accordance with Art. 15 No. 1 c) of the Brussels I Regula-
tion in order to cover all kinds of business-to-consumer contracts (see supra C). In 
this context the absolute silence of the Commission’s proposal with regard to the 
conflict of laws effects of the “total harmonisation”-approach seems to be some-
what surprising. In fact, either the Home State principle will apply under the Cassis 
philosophy of the ECJ, or Art. 5 of a future Rome Regulation will lead to the appli-
cability of the consumer state’s law. However, the choice of the law of any Member 
State of the EU cannot deprive the consumer of the protection of the law of its state 
of habitual residence, once Member States’ laws are fully harmonised. Thus, a con-
tractual choice of the law of another Member State will remain effective under cur-
rent Art. 5 (2) Rome Convention. In any case, the effect of the proposed total har-
monisation is that creditors are able to distribute throughout the Internal market 
under a single legal regime (European passport principle). 
 
                                           
32 See Kristin Nemeth & Helmut Ortner, The Proposal for a new Directive concerning Credit for Consu-
mers, 4 German L. J. No. 8 (1 August 2003): 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/Vol04No08/PDF_Vol_04_No_08_801-
813_european_Nemeth_Ortner.pdf  
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The question remains, why the Commission is not explicitly naming the country of 
origin approach as inherent in its proposal. An explanation might be the above 
(para 1) noted common disregard of full harmonisation and the Home State 
principle in the area of consumer protection law. And in fact, on 20 April 2004 the 
European Parliament (the “EP”) endorsed the proposal in its first reading subject to 
amendments, amongst which the almost complete abandonment of the “total 
harmonisation”-clause is the most interesting. In a report to the EP’s Committee on 
Legal Affairs and the Internal Market dated 2 April 2004 and prepared by the 
German Member of EP, Joachim Wuermeling, the above quoted Art. 30 No. 1 of the 
proposal was deleted and a new No. 6 added as follows: “This Directive shall not 
prevent Member States from maintaining or adopting more far-reaching provisions 
for the best possible consumer protection in accordance with their Treaty 
obligations.”34 Members of the EP argued that the major aim of the directive should 
be to establish minimum EU-wide standards for consumer credit agreements and 
not full harmonisation, since the latter would lower the standard of consumer 
protection in many EU countries. They therefore said Member States should retain 
the right to grant their consumers even higher standards of protection. However, it 
was acknowledged that in some areas full harmonisation may be needed to ensure 
that consumers can compare offers in order to boost an internal market in 
consumer credit. An example would be the rules on the annual percentage rate of 
charge laid down in the directive. 
 
E. Conclusion: An emerging System of European Contract Law(s)? 
 
The awareness of the necessity of a systematic approach to all aspects of European 
contract law, i.e. substantive general, business, and consumer contract law as well 
as corresponding rules for conflict of laws, based on overarching principles, seems 
t o  s p r e a d  e s p e c i a l l y  w i t h i n  t h e  C o m m i s s i o n  s e r v i c e s  a n d  m o r e  g e n e r a l l y  i n  t h e  
context of the Action Plan. However, since consumer law for many remains to be a 
kind of “holy cow” of the 20th century national welfare-state in relation to its 
citizens (“German law for German consumers”), in the praxis of European 
legislation under Art. 95 EC-Treaty it remains difficult for the concept of the 
“Citizen of Europe” as entrenched in the philosophy of the Internal market to 
prevail. 
 
Although it always seems to be somewhat foolish to embark on “Commission 
bashing” from the ivory tower of academia, a lot of the problems involved in the 
above described projects of the Commission are caused by a lack of a systematic 
                                           
34 PE 338.483 Doc. A5-0224/2004, available through the European Commission’s Prelex and the EP OEIL 
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approach in its acitivities (i.e. multiple directive and green paper launching) and – 
in addition – a lack of clear cut communication of the underlying principles of its 
initiatives. Why, for example, is the Commission promoting two directives at the 
same time, where one (Consumer Credit) entails an explicit full harmonisation 
clause without the corresponding conflict rule (Home State principle), while the 
other (Unfair Commercial Practices) contains an Internal market conflict rule 
(Home State principle) but no explicit full harmonisation clause? And why do both 
proposals fail to explain the inherent concept behind the combination of full 
harmonisation and mutual recognition? Moreover, while the Commission in both 
projects is very carefully and empirically well informed describing the relevant 
barriers to the Internal market, which shall be tackled by the harmonisation 
measures, and which barriers are a necessary precondition in order to construct a 
Community competency under Art. 95 EC-Treaty, why is the Commission not 
expressly stating that all the proposed harmonisation measures are suited to 
overcome the described barriers to the Internal market only, if they are combined 
with mutual recognition based on either full harmonisation or the presumption of 
equivalence following from minimum harmonisation? 
 
Taking the proposed Consumer Credit Directive as an example, the Commission 
should inform the Council and the European Parliament in a straight forward 
manner that under the ratio of Art.  95 EC-Treaty there is absolutely no use to 
proceed on a further and even more excessive harmonisation of Member State’s 
laws without at the same time fully harmonizing   the mandatory information 
obligations as well as the calculation of the cooling-off period, and not only “the 
rules on the annual percentage rate” as suggested by the EP. As to the question, 
which specific rules call for mutual recognition and thus for full harmonisation, the 
Commission could take the work of Stefan Grundmann and Wolfgang Kerber on a 
European System of Contract Laws35 as a guideline, where both authors explain in 
detail, why from the standpoint of a supplier with a Europe-wide distribution 
strategy it is essential that all obligations which have to be fulfilled before or while 
a contract is concluded (i.e. information obligations) have to be uniform or subject 
to the Home State principle, while substantive mandatory protection rules which 
only alter the outcome of a potential trial without generating pre-dispute 
obligations to provide information may remain subject to decentralised legislation 
by the Member States. 
 
 
35 Stefan Grundmann and Wolfgang Kerber, European System of Contract Laws – a Map for Combining 
the Advantages of Centralised and Decentralised Rule-making, in: Stefan Grundmann and Jules Stuyck 
(eds.), An Academic Green Paper on European Contract Law, Kluwer 2002, p. 295 ff. 